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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Although there is a general consensus that the immigration system in 
the United States is in dire need of reform, it is still unclear whether Congress 
will pass a comprehensive immigration reform bill in the near future.1  Under 
current immigration laws, noncitizens face serious consequences, even minor 
criminal convictions.  The Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) 
currently allows for a lawful permanent resident to be detained and placed in 
removal proceedings after a conviction for an “aggravated felony,” a 
conviction for a “crime involving moral turpitude” (“CIMT”) within five 
years of admission, or two convictions for “crimes involving moral 
turpitude.”2  Moreover, the overly broad interpretation of those terms has led 
to dire immigration consequences for even the pettiest of crimes. For 
instance, under the CIMT provision, a lawful permanent resident could be 
placed in removal proceedings for shoplifting no more than an article of 
clothing and a stuffed animal.3  Thus, a noncitizen could face removal over 
criminal convictions that, in many states, constitute misdemeanors and face 
penalties of no more than court supervision.4 
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1. Burgess Everett & Seung Min Kim, Immigration Reform Looks Dead in This Congress, POLITICO 
(Mar. 9, 2015, 5:36 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/03/immigration-reform-congress-
115880.html. 
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (2013). 
3. Lisa Koop, Rethink Immigration: Minor Crimes Should Not Lead to Immigration Exile, NAT’L 
IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR. (Mar. 10, 2013, 11:14 AM), http://immigrantjustice.org/staff/blog/ 
rethink-immigration-minor-crimes-should-not-lead-immigration-exile#.UjecYT-E5bU. 
4. See IND. CODE § 35-43-4-2 (2014) (classifying theft as a Class A misdemeanor); 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/16-1 (2014) (classifying theft of property not exceeding $500 in value is a Class A 
misdemeanor); WIS. STAT. § 943.20 (2014) (classifying theft not exceeding $2500 in value as a 
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Yet, even if a comprehensive immigration reform bill were to be 
enacted, it is unlikely that it would contain any provisions dealing with the 
disproportionately harsh immigration consequences of minor criminal 
convictions.5  In fact, the historical trend has been to broaden the criminal 
grounds for removability.6  Thus, judicially imposed limits on the scope of 
the immigration courts’ review of criminal offenses are paramount in 
preventing minor convictions from resulting in immigration exile. 
This Note will examine the effect of Moncrieffe v. Holder in removal 
proceedings based on an aggravated felony conviction or convictions for 
crimes involving moral turpitude.  It will argue that in Moncrieffe, the 
Supreme Court correctly limited the scope of review for determining whether 
a criminal conviction constitutes an aggravated felony.  It will also argue that, 
because of analogous statutory language, Moncrieffe should be interpreted to 
limit the immigration judges’ review of whether a criminal conviction 
involves moral turpitude. 
Section II of this Note will provide an overview of relevant statutes and 
case law regarding removability of noncitizens on the grounds of aggravated 
felonies or crimes involving moral turpitude. Next, Section III will 
specifically discuss the Supreme Court decision in Moncrieffe.  Finally, 
Section IV will examine why the majority in Moncrieffe correctly limited the 
aggravated felony review, the effects Moncrieffe will have on noncitizens’ 
removability on the grounds of an aggravated felony conviction, and the 
possible effects of this decision on the scope of review of crimes involving 
moral turpitude. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Under Section 237 of the INA, a noncitizen is deportable when he is 
convicted inter alia “of a crime involving moral turpitude . . . for which a 
sentence of one year or longer may be imposed” within five years of 
admission, “of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out 
of a single scheme of criminal misconduct” or “of an aggravated felony.”7 
                                                                                                                 
Class A misdemeanor); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 514.030 (West 2013) (classifying theft generally 
as a Class A misdemeanor). 
5. See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744, 113th 
Cong. (2013). 
6. See Adriane Meneses, The Deportation of Lawful Permanent Residents for Old and Minor Crimes: 
Restoring Judicial Review, Ending Retroactivity, and Recognizing Deportation as Punishment, 14 
SCHOLAR 767, 781 (2012) (“The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (ADAA) defined ‘aggravated 
felony,’ to include only the crimes of murder, narcotics trafficking, and trafficking in firearms. 
Subsequent legislation, however, broadened the definition in 1990 and again in 1994 to include 
both more serious and less serious crimes.”). 
7.  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (2013). 
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Courts have struggled to decide whether an aggravated felony or a CIMT 
finding should be made solely through the categorical approach, which 
allows inquiry into the elements of the crime, or also through the modified 
categorical approach, which allows inquiry into the record of conviction.8 
Yet some courts, along with the Attorney General, have expanded the moral 
turpitude inquiry beyond the modified categorical approach, allowing inquiry 
beyond the record of conviction and into the arrest record and charging 
documents.9  First, this section will examine the landmark Supreme Court 
decision defining the categorical and modified categorical approaches in the 
criminal context.  It will then analyze relevant statutes and recent Supreme 
Court decisions interpreting the aggravated felony provision leading up to 
the Court’s decision in Moncrieffe.  Finally, this section will analyze recent 
and relevant decisions regarding CIMTs. 
A.  The Categorical and Modified Categorical Approaches in the Criminal 
Context: Taylor v. United States 
In its landmark categorical approach decision, the Supreme Court 
examined a sentence enhancement provision under the Armed Career 
Criminal Act (“ACCA”).10  This provision requires the defendant to have 
been previously convicted of a “violent felony,” including “burglary.”11  The 
Court concluded that, because “burglary” is not defined within the statute, a 
state conviction must have all the basic elements of the generic crime of 
burglary to become grounds for an ACCA sentence enhancement.12  In 
reaching its decision, the Court referenced the statutory language, which 
requires that the defendant be convicted of, rather than simply commit, 
violent offenses.13  Further, the Court emphasized “the practical difficulties 
and potential unfairness of a factual approach” which would, in essence, lead 
sentencing courts to relitigate prior convictions.14 
 Yet, the Court allowed an exception to the categorical approach “in a 
narrow range of cases where a jury was actually required to find all the 
elements of generic burglary.”15  The Court concluded that, in those cases, a 
court may look beyond the elements of the generic crime and into the record 
of conviction to find whether the “jury was actually required to find all the 
                                                                                                                 
8. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). 
9. Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 699–704 (A.G. 2008); Mata-Guerrero v. Holder, 627 
F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 2010). 
10. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 577–78. 
11. Id., 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(e), 922(g) (2013). 
12. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598–99. 
13. Id. at 600–01. 
14. Id. at 601. 
15. Id. at 602. 
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elements of [the] generic [crime].”16  This exception to the categorical 
approach has come to be known as the “modified categorical approach.”17 
Although Taylor is a criminal case, its reasoning and holding are applied to 
aggravated felony and CIMT inquiries in the immigration context.18 
B.  Relevant Statutes and Decisions Leading up to Moncrieffe 
 The difficulty in resolving the scope of review for aggravated felonies 
arises from the complexity of the term.  The term “aggravated felony” refers 
to over twenty categories and subcategories of crimes.19  Some of these 
categories refer to common law crimes, such as theft.20  Others, such as 
“illicit trafficking of a controlled substance” directly cross-reference the 
Federal Criminal Code.21  More than these categories, however, judicial 
interpretation of the INA and review into state convictions has shaped the 
scope of “aggravated felony”, and thus the grounds for removability.   
1.  The Categorical Approach in the Aggravated Felony Context: 
Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder 
In Carachuri-Rosendo, the Supreme Court applied the categorical 
approach underlined in Taylor to the aggravated felony provision of the 
INA.22  Here, the petitioner had been previously convicted of two minor drug 
offenses.23 The first was a conviction for possession of about two grams of 
marijuana for which he received a twenty-day sentence.24  The second was a 
conviction for “possession without a prescription of one tablet of a common 
antianxiety medication” for which he received a ten-day sentence.25  Yet, if 
charged under the federal recidivist statute, the petitioner’s second conviction 
                                                                                                                 
16. Id. 
17. Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45, 54 (1st Cir. 2006) (applying the Taylor approach in the 
immigration context and observing the use of the term “modified categorical approach” to refer to 
the second step of the Taylor analysis). 
18. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (applying Taylor in the immigration 
context). 
19. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2013). 
20. Id. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (stating that an alien is removable for “a theft offense . . . or burglary offense 
for which the term of imprisonment at least one year”). 
21. See id. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (cross-referencing 21 U.S.C. § 802 for definitions related to illicit 
trafficking of a controlled substance and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for elements of a drug trafficking 
offense). 
22. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 566 (2010); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); Id. § 
1101(a)(43). 
23. Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 565. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 566. 
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would have amounted to an aggravated felony.26  The Court acknowledged 
that it would be “unorthodox to classify this type of petty simple possession 
recidivism as an ‘aggravated felony’” and concluded that, because the statute 
refers to a conviction, the Court’s inquiry is limited to the actual conviction 
and not what could have been.27  Although the petitioner could have been 
prosecuted under the federal recidivist statute, he was not; thus, the Court’s 
inquiry was limited accordingly.28  This decision is in line with the reasoning 
in Taylor, where the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized the inherent unfairness 
of looking into the nature of the crime, rather than the elements of 
conviction.29 
2.  Disregarding the Categorical Approach: The Circuit Split 
Although the Supreme Court applied Taylor’s categorical approach to 
the immigration context based on the same rationale of fairness and 
efficiency, some circuit courts adopted a hypothetical federal felony 
approach to determine whether a state conviction constitutes an aggravated 
felony.30  The hypothetical federal felony approach allows a court to base its 
inquiry into a noncitizen’s state conviction on “whether the underlying 
offense would have been punishable as a felony under federal law.”31 Thus, 
prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Moncrieffe, some circuits applied 
the categorical approach, which looks at the elements of a conviction, while 
other circuits applied the hypothetical federal felony approach, which looks 
at the underlying conduct of a crime by reviewing how the noncitizen’s state 
conviction would have been prosecuted in the federal system.32 
In Wilson v. Ashcroft, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals examined the 
hypothetical federal prosecution approach in deciding whether a state 
conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute qualified as 
an aggravated felony.33  Yet, the Court decided against adopting this standard 
finding that, because the elements of Wilson’s conviction did not necessarily 
                                                                                                                 
26. Id. at 569.  
27. See id. at 575-77 (“Although a federal immigration court may have the power to make a recidivist 
finding in the first instance, . . . it cannot, ex post, enhance the state offense of record just because 
facts known to it would have authorized a greater penalty under either state or federal law”). 
28. See id. 
29. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601 (1990). 
30. See Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 565.  But see Julce v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 30, 34–35 (1st Cir. 
2008); Garcia v. Holder, 638 F.3d 511, 515–17 (6th Cir. 2011). 
31. Julce, 530 F.3d at 33 (quoting Berhe v. Gonzalez, 464 F.3d 74, 84 (1st Cir. 2006)). 
32. Compare id., with Martinez v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 113, 117 (2d Cir. 2008). 
33. Wilson v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377, 379–80 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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proscribe possession with intent to distribute, a court may not presume 
otherwise.34  
Similarly, in Martinez v. Mukasey, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
applied the categorical approach to determine whether the respondent’s 
conviction for distribution of a small amount of marijuana constituted illicit 
trafficking of a controlled substance, and thus an aggravated felony, under 
the INA.35 There, the court determined that, because the respondent’s 
conviction could fall under either the felony or misdemeanor provisions of 
the Controlled Substances Act, it did not constitute an aggravated felony 
under the INA.36 
In Julce v. Mukasey, however, the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
applied the hypothetical federal felony approach to find that, because the 
misdemeanor provision of the Controlled Substances Act is a mitigating 
sentencing factor, felony is the default punishment.37  Thus, the respondent’s 
conviction is presumed to be an aggravated felony lest he can prove 
otherwise.38  Similarly, in Garcia v. Holder the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals followed the hypothetical federal felony approach to find that, 
because the felony provision of the Controlled Substances Act is the default 
punishment, the respondent’s conviction for attempted possession of an 
unknown amount of marijuana with intent to distribute with no statutory 
remuneration requirement constituted an aggravated felony.39 
Thus, when the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with the 
respondent’s state conviction for possession of a small amount of marijuana 
in Moncrieffe v. Holder, it had to decide whether to follow the categorical 
approach or adopt the hypothetical federal felony approach.40  The Court 
acknowledged the circuit split and decided to adopt the hypothetical federal 
felony approach, holding that, because felony would be the default 
punishment in a federal prosecution, Moncrieffe’s conviction was presumed 
to be an aggravated felony.41  Based on this circuit split, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in Moncrieffe to determine the validity of the hypothetical 
federal felony approach in the immigration context.42 
 Altogether, the decisions regarding removability under the INA’s 
aggravated felony provision illustrate the difficulty in limiting the inquiry 
into prior state convictions.  Although the Court’s decision in Moncrieffe 
                                                                                                                 
34. Id. at 381–82. 
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2013); Id. § 1101(a)(43)(B); Martinez, 551 F.3d at 115–17. 
36. Martinez, 551 F.3d at 120. 
37. Julce, 530 F.3d at 35. 
38. Id. 
39. 638 F.3d 511, 516 (6th Cir. 2011). 
40. Moncrieffe v. Holder (Moncrieffe I), 662 F.3d 387, 391 (5th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1678 
(2013). 
41. Id. 
42. Moncrieffe v. Holder (Moncrieffe II), 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013). 
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decidedly narrowed review under the aggravated felony provision, a similar, 
albeit more polarized, dissonance persists in the context of the “crimes 
involving moral turpitude” provisions. 
C.  Silva-Trevino and the Three-Step Inquiry into Moral Turpitude 
 Unlike the aggravated felony provision, which is defined within the 
INA, the term “crimes involving moral turpitude” lacks a statutory definition 
or method for immigration judges to determine whether a prior conviction is 
turpitudinous.43  The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), however, has 
established that “[m]oral turpitude refers generally to conduct that shocks the 
public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to 
the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to 
society in general.”44 Yet, even this definition fails to define a clear standard 
for determining which crimes are turpitudinous. Not surprisingly, different 
circuits began developing different precedent until, in 2008, the Attorney 
General decided to step in and create a uniform approach to moral turpitude. 
Instead, the Attorney General’s decision in Silva-Trevino has resulted in yet 
another circuit split. 
1.  An Attempt at Uniformity: Matter of Silva-Trevino 
In Silva-Trevino, the Attorney General sought to address the lack of 
statutory methodology and “resulting patchwork” of judicial decisions by 
creating a uniform approach to the moral turpitude inquiry.45 To this end, the 
Attorney General instituted a three-step inquiry.  At step one, an immigration 
judge must, by employing the categorical approach, look to the statute of 
conviction and determine whether there is a “realistic probability” that it 
could be applied to reach conduct that does involve moral turpitude.46  If the 
conviction is categorically not turpitudinous, the inquiry must end.47 
However, if the categorical inquiry is inconclusive because the “statute 
encompasses both conduct that involves moral turpitude and conduct that 
does not,” the immigration judge should proceed to step two: the modified 
categorical approach.48  Under the modified categorical approach, an 
                                                                                                                 
43. Jeremiah J. Farrelly, Denying Formalism’s Apologists: Reforming Immigration Law’s CIMT 
Analysis, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 877, 882 (2011) (“Despite repeated Congressional acknowledgment 
of the phrase’s vagueness, no statutory definition of ‘crime involving moral turpitude’ has ever been 
provided by Congress”).  See Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 693 (A.G. 2008). 
44. Hamdan v. I.N.S., 98 F.3d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting the BIA’s decision on that case). 
45. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 693–95. 
46. Id. at 693–98. 
47. See id. at 690. 
48. Id. at 698. 
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immigration judge may look beyond the language of the statute and into the 
record of conviction, “including documents such as the indictment, the 
judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, or the plea 
transcript.”49  However, if even after this second step, the immigration judge 
finds that the result is inconclusive, the Attorney General allows further 
inquiry into the underlying facts of the conviction under Silva-Trevino’s third 
step.50  In so allowing, the Attorney General justified this departure from the 
Taylor limitations, stating, “moral turpitude is a non-element aggravating 
factor that ‘stands apart from the elements of the [underlying criminal] 
offense.’”51 
2.  Moral Turpitude After Silva-Trevino: The Circuit Split 
The Attorney General’s attempt at creating a uniform inquiry in Silva-
Trevino resulted in just the kind of “patchwork” he sought to end. Although 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals embraced the Silva-Trevino approach, 
holding that the Attorney General’s review under the three-step approach is 
entitled to Chevron deference,52 several other circuits have held otherwise. 
The Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have found that, because the 
INA requires that a noncitizen be convicted of a CIMT, the Attorney 
General’s third step inquiry, which allows an immigration judge to look 
beyond the record of conviction, is an impermissible reading of the statute 
and, therefore, not entitled to Chevron deference.53  While the Supreme Court 
has not yet spoken to this specific inquiry, based on the analogous statutory 
language between the aggravated felony and the crimes involving moral 
                                                                                                                 
49. See id. at 690. 
50. See id. at 699. 
51. Id. at 704. 
52. See Mata-Guerrero v. Holder, 627 F.3d 256, 259-61 (7th Cir. 2010) (agreeing with the Attorney 
General’s reasoning that the purpose of the CIMT inquiry “is to look at the actual crime committed 
by the individual alien”).  See also Chevron U.S., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 
842-44 (1984) (holding that an agency’s interpretation of the statute it administers is entitled to 
judicial deference where the statute is silent or ambiguous and the interpretation is a reasonable 
reading of the statute). 
53. Olivas-Motta v. Holder, 716 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that the approach in Silva-
Trevino applies an erroneous definition of “convicted of” and is not entitled to Chevron deference); 
Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 484 (4th Cir. 2012) (declining to extend deference and holding 
that because “the moral turpitude statute is neither ambiguous nor silent, but explicitly directs that 
apart from certain types of admissions made by a defendant at his criminal proceedings, an 
adjudicator applying the moral turpitude statute may consider only the noncitizen’s prior conviction 
and not the conduct underlying that conviction”); Fajardo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d 1303, 1310 
(11th Cir. 2011) (“Congress unambiguously intended adjudicators to use the categorical and 
modified categorical approach to determine whether a person was convicted of a crime involving 
moral turpitude.”); Jean-Louis v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 473 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We conclude 
that we are not bound by the Attorney General’s view because it is bottomed on an impermissible 
reading of the statute, which, we believe, speaks with the requisite clarity.”). 
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turpitude provisions, the Court’s decision in Moncrieffe can be applied in the 
CIMT context to resolve the circuit split. 
III.  EXPOSITION OF THE CASE 
 In Moncrieffe v. Holder, the Supreme Court once again was faced with 
a case involving the INA’s aggravated felony provision.54  Through this 
decision, the Court solved the facial discrepancies of its last two decisions 
involving the same provision, and conclusively limited a court’s inquiry 
under the aggravated felony provision to the categorical approach. 
A.  Facts and Procedural Posture 
Moncrieffe, a native and citizen of Jamaica who had been living in the 
United States as a permanent resident since 1984, pleaded guilty to 
possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute after police found about 
1.3 grams of marijuana in his car during a traffic stop in 2007.55 
After Moncrieffe pleaded guilty to possession with the intent to 
distribute, the trial court sentenced him to five years of probation.56  The 
Department of Homeland Security then initiated removal proceedings against 
Moncrieffe, arguing that possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute 
constitutes an aggravated felony because it is an offense punishable by up to 
five years imprisonment under the Federal Controlled Substances Act 
(“CSA”).57  During removal proceedings, the immigration judge ordered 
Moncrieffe removed.58  On appeal, the BIA affirmed that order.59 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the BIA’s decision.60  In so 
holding, the court applied the categorical and modified categorical 
approaches, acknowledging the circuit split regarding convictions based on 
state statutes that cover both “the felony and misdemeanor conduct 
proscribed by” the CSA.61  The court ultimately adopted the view that felony 
is the default punishment in such a case.  Accordingly, the court held that, 
                                                                                                                 
54. 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1682 (2013); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2013). 
55. Moncrieffe II, 133 S. Ct. at 1683. 
56. See id. 
57. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D) (2013). See id. 
58. Moncrieffe II, 133 S. Ct. at 1683. 
59. Id. 
60. Moncrieffe I, 662 F.3d 387, 389 (5th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013). 
61. See id. at 391 (“[T]he courts of appeals are split on whether the conviction, if lacking specifics of 
the underlying criminal conduct, should be treated as a felony or a misdemeanor.  The First and 
Sixth Circuits hold that the default punishment . . . is a felony, while the Second and Third Circuits 
hold that the default punishment is a misdemeanor.”). 
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because Moncrieffe failed to prove otherwise, his conviction constituted a 
felony and thus a removable offense under the aggravated felony provision.62 
B.  The Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split 
regarding whether a state conviction, grounded on a statute that criminalizes 
conduct described by both the felony and misdemeanor provisions of the 
Controlled Substances Act, is punishable as a felony.63  As a result, the Court 
reversed the Fifth Circuit’s decision, holding that Moncrieffe’s state 
conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute is not an 
aggravated felony under the INA.64 
In reaching this decision, the Court employed the categorical approach, 
emphasizing that for a conviction to satisfy this approach under the “illicit 
trafficking in a controlled substance” section of the aggravated felony 
provision, it must “necessarily” proscribe conduct that is an offense under 
the CSA, and the CSA must “necessarily” proscribe felony punishment for 
that conduct.65 Based on this reasoning, the Court found that, because the 
Georgia statute of conviction could include both a felony and a misdemeanor 
offense under the CSA, Moncrieffe’s conviction did not necessarily 
constitute a felony offense under the CSA.66  Furthermore, the Court 
reasoned that the Fifth Circuit’s application of a hypothetical federal felony 
to find a “default” punishment is contrary to the categorical approach, which 
does not allow inquiry into hypothetical prosecutions, but rather limits the 
inquiry to the actual conviction.67  In so holding, the Court abrogated the First 
and Sixth Circuit’s adoption of the hypothetical federal felony approach and 
effectively resolved the circuit split on this matter. 
Lastly, the Court emphasized the possible inequities that would result 
from following the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning, “render[ing] even an undisputed 
misdemeanor an aggravated felony.”68  The Court further explained the 
reasoning for this limited inquiry.  First, the Court pointed to the language of 
the statute, which asks what the noncitizen was “convicted of” rather than 
what the noncitizen actually did.69  Then, the Court exposed the lack of 
                                                                                                                 
62. See id. at 391–93. 
63. Moncrieffe II, 133 S. Ct. at 1684. Compare Garcia v. Holder, 638 F.3d 511, 515–17 (6th Cir. 2011), 
and Julce v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 30, 34–36 (1st Cir. 2008), with Martinez v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 
113, 120 (2d Cir. 2008), and Wilson v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377, 381–82 (3d Cir. 2003). 
64. Moncrieffe II, 133 S. Ct. at 1682. 
65. Id. at 1685. 
66. Id. at 1686–87. 
67. Id. at 1688. 
68. Id. at 1689. 
69. Id. at 1690. 
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statutory language authorizing “case-specific factfinding in immigration 
court.”70 To allow such inquiry, the Court reasoned, would result in “post hoc 
investigation” and “relitigation of past convictions in minitrials conducted 
long after the fact.”71 It is better, the Court concluded, to “err on the side of 
underinclusiveness because ambiguity in criminal statutes referenced by the 
INA must be construed in the noncitizen’s favor.”72  Therefore, based on a 
categorical inquiry, where the statute of conviction for marijuana possession 
with intent to distribute “fails to establish that the offense involved either 
remuneration or more than a small amount of marijuana,” the conviction does 
not constitute a removable offense under the aggravated felony provision of 
the INA.73 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Moncrieffe, the Court correctly held that a prior state conviction for 
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, either for a small amount of 
marijuana or with no requirement of remuneration, does not constitute an 
aggravated felony because it does not “necessarily” fall into the felony 
provision of the Controlled Substances Act.  This decision is a definite stride 
forward in preventing disproportionately harsh immigration consequences 
for minor crimes, both in the aggravated felony and the CIMT contexts. This 
section will analyze how the majority in Moncrieffe correctly interpreted and 
applied statutory language to limit the inquiry into past convictions in the 
aggravated felony context.  It will then argue that, because of analogous 
statutory language, Moncrieffe should be interpreted to limit inquiry into 
prior state convictions in the context of crimes involving moral turpitude. 
A.  The Moncrieffe Decision: Limiting the Aggravated Felony Inquiry 
The holding in Moncrieffe is correct because it narrows the scope of 
review based on the language of the INA and acknowledges the important 
policy considerations underlying the categorical approach. 
1.  Abrogating the Hypothetical Federal Felony Approach 
In rejecting the hypothetical federal felony approach employed by the 
Fifth Circuit to justify felony as the default punishment, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 1693. 
73. Id. at 1693–94. 
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correctly aligned the scope of review with the INA’s language and 
strengthened the foundation of the categorical approach. 
Because the INA’s aggravated felony provision inquires what the 
noncitizen was convicted of, rather than what crime he committed or what 
conviction he could have received, the inquiry into the noncitizen’s past 
convictions cannot go beyond his actual convictions.74  This statutory 
restriction was the foundation of the categorical approach.75  It is because of 
this restriction that the categorical approach limits inquiry beyond the 
elements of the crime or, at most, beyond the record of conviction.76 
Therefore, to allow courts to use hypothetical prosecutions under the guise 
of the categorical approach would contravene the language of the INA and 
render the categorical approach futile. 
Moreover, a court should not be able to assume a default punishment 
where there is no statutory indication of such a default.  Since the categorical 
approach looks to both the elements of the offense and the prescribed 
punishment, to set a default punishment where there is none is equivalent to 
assuming the existence of an element that is not required under the statute.77 
A court cannot engage in such assumptions as to nonexistent statutory 
elements.78  Therefore, the Supreme Court correctly abrogated the 
hypothetical federal felony approach and rejected the adoption of a default 
punishment in Moncrieffe. 
2.  Policy Justifications 
The Court was also correct in acknowledging the strong policy interests 
in limiting the scope of review to actual convictions.  From its inception, the 
categorical approach has sought to avert the “practical difficulties and 
potential unfairness” of inquiry into the underlying facts of a conviction 
rather than the conviction itself.79 
                                                                                                                 
74. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2013). 
75. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600–01 (1990). See also Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 
560 U.S. 563, 579 (2010) (applying Taylor in the immigration context and reaffirming that 
“conviction [is] the relevant statutory hook”). 
76. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–02 (defining the categorical and modified categorical approaches). 
77. See Moncrieffe II, 133 S. Ct. at 1685 (“[T]o satisfy the categorical approach, a state drug offense 
must meet two conditions:  It must ‘necessarily’ proscribe conduct that is an offense under the CSA, 
and the CSA must ‘necessarily’prescribe felony punishment for that conduct.”). 
78. Matter of Lopez-Bustos, 2010 WL 4213214 (BIA 2010) (citing Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 
(1966)) (A court cannot “simply assume a permanent taking was intended” when “the statute of 
conviction does not require . . . any findings as to whether a temporary or permanent deprivation of 
property was contemplated, and where the other conviction records do not provide evidence directly 
bearing on this issue.”). 
79. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601. 
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Yet, through the use of the hypothetical federal felony approach, the 
Court of Appeals for the First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits attempted to 
circumvent the inquiry restrictions of the categorical approach by reviewing 
how noncitizens could have been convicted in the federal system rather than 
their actual convictions.80 This is not an acceptable application of the 
categorical approach. In allowing a hypothetical conviction inquiry and the 
default punishment that results from such an inquiry, the circuit courts 
effectively placed a burden on the noncitizen to prove that his conviction 
does not fall within the default punishment.81 This would result in precisely 
the inherently unfair and inefficient post hoc factfinding and relitigation that 
the categorical approach sought to avoid.82 
For example, in the case of Moncrieffe, he would have had to prove that 
his conviction for possession of marijuana was for a small amount, with no 
remuneration, years after his conviction took place.  While the record shows 
that he was in possession of a small amount of marijuana, there is no 
indication of any proof as to the remuneration.  This was not an element of 
the original conviction and, therefore, may not be in the record at all.  In 
forcing a noncitizen to prove something outside of the record of conviction, 
years after the fact, the hypothetical federal felony approach forces the 
noncitizen to present evidence that the sentencing court never took into 
consideration, thus forcing the immigration courts to relitigate the 
conviction.  This is especially troublesome in the immigration context, where 
“most non-citizens come into contact with immigration enforcement officers, 
are ordered deported, and are physically removed from the United States 
without ever seeing a lawyer.”83 
While the categorical approach is not perfect, its weaknesses do not 
outweigh the interest in avoiding such unfair relitigation of noncitizens’ 
convictions.  The Court in Moncrieffe correctly weighed the inherent 
                                                                                                                 
80. See Moncrieffe I, 662 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013); Garcia v. Holder, 
638 F.3d 511, 515–17 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that because the felony provision of the Controlled 
Substances Act is the default punishment, respondent’s conviction for attempted possession of an 
unknown amount of marijuana with intent to distribute with no statutory remuneration requirement 
constituted an aggravated felony); Julce v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 30, 34–36 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding 
that because the misdemeanor provision of the Controlled Substances Act is a mitigating sentencing 
factor, felony is the default punishment and respondent’s conviction constitutes an aggravated 
felony). 
81. See Moncrieffe II, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2013). 
82. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601; Moncrieffe II, 133 S. Ct. at 1690 (citing Chambers v. United States, 
555 U.S. 122, 125 (2009)) (“The categorical approach serves ‘practical’ purposes: It promotes 
judicial and administrative efficiency by precluding the relitigation of past convictions in minitrials 
conducted long after the fact.”). 
83. Keren Zwick, Rethink Immigration: Right to a Lawyer? The Fiction of Legal Counsel in 
Immigration Proceedings, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR. (Mar. 22, 2013, 12:42 PM), 
http://www.immigrantjustice.org/staff/blog/rethink-immigration-right-to-lawyer#.UoEA_-ORUQ. 
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unfairness of such an approach against the possibility that some noncitizens 
who were convicted of possession of larger amounts of marijuana or of 
possession with the intent to distribute with remuneration may escape 
mandatory removal.84  That possibility, the Court concluded, does not 
outweigh the inherent unfairness and impractical results that would stem 
from requiring immigration courts to relitigate prior state convictions.85 
Moreover, the Court reasoned, even if a noncitizen could avoid mandatory 
removal, he may not be able to avoid discretionary removal.86  The Court’s 
decision against relitigation is in line with precedent requiring “ambiguity in 
criminal statutes referenced by the INA” to be “construed in the noncitizen’s 
favor.”87 
Altogether, the Supreme Court’s decision in Moncrieffe constitutes a 
stride forward in avoiding disproportionately harsh immigration 
consequences for minor criminal convictions.  By preventing a default 
punishment system that would deem even undisputed misdemeanors as 
aggravated felonies and require noncitizens to relitigate their convictions, the 
Court ultimately strengthened the categorical approach and realigned its 
application with the language of the INA. 
B.  Applying Moncrieffe to Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude 
While Moncrieffe has an important impact in preventing minor offenses 
from resulting in removal in the aggravated felony context, its impact in the 
moral turpitude context is similarly important.  Because of the analogous 
statutory language and policy considerations between the aggravated felony 
provision and the crimes involving moral turpitude provisions, Moncrieffe is 
applicable in the CIMT context.  Thus, in restricting the aggravated felony 
inquiry, Moncrieffe similarly restricted the moral turpitude inquiry by 
effectively abrogating the third step of the Silva-Trevino test. 
1.  Moncrieffe in the Moral Turpitude Context 
The CIMT provisions, like the aggravated felony provision, ask what 
the noncitizen was convicted of.  Therefore, inquiry into prior convictions 
under all of these provisions should be similarly restricted.88  Yet, under 
                                                                                                                 
84. Moncrieffe II, 133 S. Ct. at 1691. 
85. Id. at 1693 (“We prefer this degree of imperfection to the heavy burden of relitigating old 
prosecutions.”). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. (citing Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 580 (2010) and Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 
1, 11 (2004)). 
88. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2013) (“Any alien who . . . is convicted of a crime involving 
moral turpitude committed within five years . . . after the date of admission”) (emphasis added), 
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Silva-Trevino’s third step inquiry, the Seventh Circuit allows inquiry beyond 
the categorical approach and into the underlying facts of the conviction.89 
The Seventh Circuit’s deference to the Attorney General’s three-step inquiry 
is grounded on the finding that the Silva-Trevino approach is a permissible 
interpretation of a statutory gap.90  Yet, at least four other circuit courts have 
held that the Silva-Trevino approach is not a permissible interpretation of the 
INA, and therefore not entitled to judicial deference.91  Moreover, the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the aggravated felony provision in 
Moncrieffe adds credence to the notion that Silva-Trevino’s third step inquiry 
is not a permissible interpretation of the INA’s “crimes involving moral 
turpitude” provisions.  Based on this rationale, the Seventh Circuit should 
overturn its deference to Silva-Trevino and restrict inquiry into prior state 
convictions under the crimes involving moral turpitude provision 
accordingly. 
Much like the hypothetical federal felony approach, which the Court 
rejected in Moncrieffe, the third step of the Silva-Trevino approach engages 
in a hypothetical prosecution by inquiring into a noncitizen’s underlying 
conduct, rather than his actual conviction, and therefore basing review on 
what the noncitizen could have been convicted of.92  Like the aggravated 
                                                                                                                 
and Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (“Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted of two or more 
crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct”) 
(emphasis added), with Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated 
felony at any time after admission is deportable.”) (emphasis added); see Franklin v. I.N.S., 72 F.3d 
571, 581 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing cases that interpret the aggravated felony and moral turpitude 
provisions of the INA to conclude that inquiry into both provisions is similarly restricted under the 
categorical approach). 
89. See Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 704 (A.G. 2008).  See also Mata-Guerrero v. 
Holder, 627 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 2010). 
90. See Mata-Guerrero, 627 F.3d at 259–61 (agreeing with the Attorney General’s reasoning that the 
purpose of the CIMT inquiry “is to look at the actual crime committed by the individual alien”). 
See also Chevron U.S., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984) (holding that 
an agency’s interpretation of the statute it administers is entitled to judicial deference where the 
statute is silent or ambiguous and the interpretation is a reasonable reading of the statute). 
91. Olivas-Motta v. Holder, 716 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that the approach in Silva-
Trevino applies an erroneous definition of “convicted of” and is not entitled to Chevron deference); 
Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 484 (4th Cir. 2012) (declining to extend deference and holding 
that because “the moral turpitude statute is neither ambiguous nor silent, but explicitly directs that 
apart from certain types of admissions made by a defendant at his criminal proceedings, an 
adjudicator applying the moral turpitude statute may consider only the alien’s prior conviction and 
not the conduct underlying that conviction”); Fajardo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d 1303, 1310 (11th 
Cir. 2011) (“Congress unambiguously intended adjudicators to use the categorical and modified 
categorical approach to determine whether a person was convicted of a crime involving moral 
turpitude.”); Jean-Louis v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 473 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We conclude that 
we are not bound by the Attorney General’s view because it is bottomed on an impermissible 
reading of the statute, which, we believe, speaks with the requisite clarity.”). 
92. Moncrieffe II, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1688 (2013); see Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 699 (“[W]hen the 
record of conviction fails to show whether the alien was convicted of a crime involving moral 
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felony provision, the moral turpitude provisions ask what the noncitizen was 
convicted of.  Thus, the Court’s admonition in Moncrieffe that “[c]onviction 
is the relevant hook,” and therefore inquiry should be limited to the 
categorical approach, is applicable in the moral turpitude context.93  To allow 
inquiry beyond the record of conviction in the moral turpitude context, like 
in the aggravated context, contravenes the plain language of the INA and 
renders the categorical approach obsolete. Based on Moncrieffe, Silva-
Trevino’s third step is not a permissible interpretation of the INA, which asks 
only what the noncitizen was convicted of, thus it is not entitled to judicial 
deference.  Therefore, Moncrieffe effectively abrogates the third step of 
Silva-Trevino because it contravenes the plain language of the INA. 
2.  Policy Consideration Under the Moral Turpitude Provision 
Similar to the aggravated felony context, allowing immigration courts 
to review the underlying facts of a noncitizen’s conviction, rather than the 
conviction itself, ignores the policy concerns of “practical difficulties and 
potential unfairness” that gave rise to the categorical approach.94  By 
requiring immigration courts to look beyond the record of conviction and into 
the underlying conduct, the Silva-Trevino approach effectively charges the 
immigration judges with relitigating prior convictions, often many years after 
the fact.  This “sort of post hoc investigation into the facts” is precisely the 
sort of relitigation that the Court has “long deemed undesirable” because of 
its inherent unfairness and resulting inefficiency.95  Moreover, in the cases 
where the noncitizen pleaded down to a lesser offense, this approach would 
undermine “the important function of recognizing and preserving the results 
of a plea bargain, where the parties, with the consent of a trial judge, agree 
to allow the defendant to plead,” and effectively deprive a noncitizen of the 
benefits of his plea bargain.96 
For example, a noncitizen can be placed in removal proceedings under 
the CIMT provision for shoplifting no more than diapers and a stuffed 
animal.97  Yet, if this noncitizen was charged in Indiana and pleaded down to 
conversion, her convictions would not amount to crimes involving moral 
                                                                                                                 
turpitude, immigration judges should be permitted to consider evidence beyond that record if doing 
so is necessary and appropriate to ensure proper application of the Act’s moral turpitude 
provisions.”). 
93. Moncrieffe II, 133 S. Ct. at 1685 (quoting Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 579 (2010)). 
94. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601 (1990). 
95. Moncrieffe II, 133 S. Ct. at 1690. 
96. Matter of Ahortalejo-Guzman, 25 I. & N. Dec. 465 (BIA 2011). 
97. Koop, supra note 3. 
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turpitude under either the categorical or modified categorical approaches.98 
The noncitizen could only be removed under Silva-Trevino’s third step 
inquiry if, after engaging in factfinding and relitigation of her conviction, an 
immigration court found that her underlying conduct was turpitudinous.  Not 
only does Silva-Trevino’s third step inquiry defy the plea bargaining system, 
but it also places lawful permanent residents, many of whom have lived most 
of their lives in the United States, in removal proceedings for crimes that 
many states consider undisputed misdemeanors.99 
Although the Attorney General justified his decision to allow inquiry 
beyond the record of conviction as a means “to ensure proper application of 
the Act’s moral turpitude provisions,” the Supreme Court in Moncrieffe 
effectively rebutted this argument by stating that a certain “degree of 
imperfection” is preferable “to the heavy burden of relitigating old 
prosecutions.”100 To advocate for deportation of lawful permanent residents, 
many of whom have married, raised United States citizens, and made their 
lives in the United States, in the name of a perfect application of the statute, 
contravenes longstanding notions of fairness that require courts to resolve 
“ambiguity in criminal statutes referenced by the INA” in favor of the 
noncitizen.101 
Thus, based on the analogous statutory language and policy 
considerations between the aggravated felony and crimes involving moral 
turpitude provisions of the INA, Moncrieffe should be interpreted to limit 
review of prior convictions under the moral turpitude provisions to the 
categorical and modified categorical approaches, effectively abrogating 
Silva-Trevino’s third step inquiry. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Moncrieffe v. Holder, the Supreme Court was faced with deciding 
whether a noncitizen’s prior state conviction should be considered, by 
default, to fall under the felony provision of the Controlled Substances Act 
and thus be rendered an aggravated felony.  The Court correctly interpreted 
the language of the INA to restrict inquiry into the noncitizen’s actual 
conviction.  In doing so, the Court prevented noncitizens’ removal over 
minor crimes that would have been rendered aggravated felonies, as well as 
                                                                                                                 
98. See IND. CODE § 35-43-4-3(a) (2013) (lacking the element of intent to permanently deprive 
necessary to render a conviction a CIMT). 
99. See IND. CODE § 35-43-4-2 (classifying theft as a Class A misdemeanor); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/16-1 (2014) (classifying theft of property not exceeding $500 in value is a Class A misdemeanor); 
WIS. STAT. § 943.20 (2014) (classifying theft not exceeding $2500 in value as a Class A 
misdemeanor); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 514.030 (West 2013) (classifying theft generally as a Class 
A misdemeanor). 
100. Moncrieffe II, 133 S. Ct. at 1693. 
101. Id. 
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crimes of which the noncitizens were never convicted.  Moreover, because 
of analogous statutory language and policy considerations, Moncrieffe 
effectively abrogates inquiry into the underlying facts of a conviction in the 
CIMT context.  Altogether, the Supreme Court’s decision in Moncrieffe is an 
important step forward in preventing minor criminal offenses from resulting 
in disproportionately harsh immigration consequences for lawful permanent 
residents. 
 
